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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LOUISE B. TAYLOR, et al,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
9874

VIRGINIA CLARE JOHNSON,
Defendant and Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff, for herself, and as
guardian of her minor children, asking damages
for the death of her· husband, who was killed while
working on a trailer stopped on the highway. The
trailer was struck by an automobile driven by the
defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Jury trial resulted in a verdict of No Cause of
Action. The trial court denied plaintiff's Motion
for Judgment Notwithstanding the verdict, or in the
alternative, for a new trial.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant states "Plaintiff seeks reversal of the
judg1nent entered, and judgment as to liability in her
favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial."
Respondent asks that the Jury Verdict be sustained
and the trial court affirmed in all particulars.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References are to the page numbers in the
Transcript of Proceedings.
Respondent cannot agree with the statement
of facts set forth by Appellant. Appellant has recited the facts according to his view of the evidence.
This court in the case of Ortega vs. Thomas, Supreme Court of Utah, Docket No. 9709, Decision
filed June 28, 1963, not yet reported in Utah or
Pacific Reports, stated:
"The rule is so fundamental that the facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the party who prevailed below, that it is
an indefensable imposition upon this court
and opposing counsel not to follow it."
There is no dispute as to the time and place
of the accident, June 13, 1961, about 10:30 p.m., on
Utah Highway U -28, approximately 9.3 miles south
of Levan. (Tr. 5) It was a dark moonless night.
The highway was asphalt, 37 feet wide, with a
broken center line. (T.132) There were painted lines
on each side of the highway 2 feet, 2 inches from the
edge of the hard surface. (T. 139) From the center
2
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line to the east edge of the hardtop it was 19 feet
2 inches, and from the center line to the west edge of
the hardtop was 17 feet 10 inches. (T. 138)
About 9:30p.m., Don R. Milner, was driving his
Chevrolet north on Highway U-28, pulling a hoinemade, 2 wheel, single axle trailer. (T. 9) Milner's
car struck a deer, damaging the rear right wheel
housing, and his car stopped on the highway, facing
north. (T. 9) The right rear wheel left a tire mark
on the highway, 158 feet 9 inches in length. This
mark extended south on the highway from directly
under the right rear wheel (T. 143;32), and was
8 feet east of the center line. (T. 141) There was
11 feet 2 inches between the east edge of the asphalt
road and the right rear wheel of the Milner car.
(Exhibit P. 13) The investigating police officer,
Rex Hill, observed the Milner vehicle position on
the highway and the tire mark leading directly to
the right rear wheel and under the car. (T. 141)
Mter hitting the deer, Milner went behind hils
vehicle, and with a flashlight, flagged down a car
approaching from the south. (T. 10) The car was
driven by Everett Kester, accompanied by his wife,
children and his sister-in-law. (T. 47) !{ester pulled
ahead of the Milner car, some distance north (T. 10)
A passing car was flagged and the occupants requested to notify a wrecker. The wrecker was sent
back to the accident scene. The wrecker operator,
James Warner Taylor, passed by the accident scene,
3
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and drove off the west side of the road where
there was a clearing. ( T. 11) This clearing, just
south of the scene, was about 40 feet in width.
(T. 155) When the wrecker arrived, the trailer
was unhitched fro1n the Milner automobile and
moved ·to the East side of the Milner vehicle and
the wrecker was backed into position directly behind
the Milner car. (T. 13) Mr. Kester backed his car
in position in front of the trailer, about a foot
from the trailer tongue. The trailer hitch was taken
off of the Milner car to be attached to the Kester
car. (T. 14) While the trailer hitch was being
attached to the Kester car, the wrecker operator
was hooking the Milner car to the \Vrecker, and
the rear end of Milner car lifted up. (T. 14)
After Taylor attached the wrecker to the Milner
car, he went to the area where the trailer was being
hitched to the Kester automobile, taking some
wrenches to tighten the bolts. (T. 16)
As the wrecker was on the roadway it was
facing south, with headlights on, two flashing amber lights on the fenders, and a rotating blue light
on top. (T. 17)
The \vrecker \vas not 1noved after· it was placed
into position behind the Milner car, and remained
on the highway facing south with the headlights
on. (T. 20) .
There were several fusees, reflectorized stands,
and pot torches in the wrecker, but none were put
4
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out. (T. 156) At no time were any flares or lanterns
placed on the highway. (T. 28) Fifteen to twenty
minutes elapsed after the wrecker picked up the
Milner automobile and the accident happened. (T.
29)
As the wrecker was stopped on the highway,
with the Milner car attached, the wrecker obscured
the tail lights of the Milner car. (T. 40) The left
front door of the wrecker was open. (T. 33) There
was about 3 to 4 feet between the Milner and Kester
cars. (T. 68)
Mter Taylor hooked the wrecker onto the
Milner car, he left the wrecker on the highway,
and spent several minutes between the trailer and
the Kester vehicle, working on the trailer hitch.
(T. 29)

The trailer had electric lights but they were
not operative after the trailer was unhitched from
Milner's car. (T. 30) The wrecker was south of the
trailer, as the men worked on the trailer hitch.
The taillights on the Kester vehicle were obscured
by the trailer. (T. 41)
With the cars on the highway the scene was
laid. Miss Johnson, the defendant, had driven from
Provo to Richfield to visit a friend who had attended
Brigham Young University with her. She left Richfield after dark to return to Provo. (T. 184)
Just south of the accident scene she was travelling 50 to 60 miles per hour. It was a dark night,
5
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with no 1noon or other lights in the area. She came
around a slight curve, about one-half mile south
of the accident scene, and observed headlights of
the wrecker and the blue light on top. (T. 187) She
saw no flares, or other warning signs and assumed
the wrecker was moving toward her, and on its
own side of the road. She looked at her speedometer
and was travelling 50 miles per hour, and she took
her foot fron1 the gas pedal. As she neared the
wrecker, she observed it to be partially in her lane
of traffic and she had to decide whether to try to
stop and hit head on, or to try to go to the side of
the wrecker. ( T. 191) She passed to the east of
the wrecker and as her lights picked up the objects
on the highway, after passing the wrecker, she tried
to apply brakes but struck the rear of the trailer,
knocking it into Kester car.
There were several flashlights at the scene before the accident, and Mrs. Kester had been going
out south of the wrecker to wave the flashlight
to warn vehicles fro1n the south. (T.94) Mrs. Kester
was between the Milner automobile and the Kester
auto1nobile when she saw the Johnson car approaching, but she did not get out in front of the wrecker
to warn Miss Johnson. ( T. 74) This was the only
vehicle from the south that had not been signalled
with a flashlight. (T. 73)
Officer Rex Hill of the Utah Highway Patrol
investigated the accident and made measurements.
6
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Although the wrecker and 1\'Iilner car were ren1oved
before he made his measurements, he observed the
wrecker on the road, facing south in the Northbound lane of traffic, (T. 123) and observed a long
tire mark on the highway running underneath the
right rear wheel of the Milner automobile. This
mark was 8 feet east of the center line. (T. 141) He
also observed other physical evidence on the roadway, gouge marks, skid marks. (T. 135, 137) He
observed debris on the highway, where the open
door of the wrecker had been struck, and paint
knocked off, and he observed the damage to the
wrecker door. (T. 140)
Exhibit P -13 received in evidence shows the
measurements made by the officer, the location of
the wrecker, Milner automobile, and other physical
evidence he observed.
Plaintiff's brief contains a diagram with the
following explanation:
"The following diagram, appellants think,
fairly depicts the respective vehicles on the
roadway at the time of the collision."
The diagram is misleading and not in any way in
accordance with the physical facts found by the investigating police officers.
Officer Hill found that the mark left by the
right rear wheel of· the Milner automobile was 8
7
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feet east of the center line of the highway. (T. 141)
This would leave 11 feet 2 inches of hardtop surface
of the highway east of the Milner automobile and
the wrecker, as they were stopped on the highway.
(T. 164)
The Milner car and the wrecker occupied 8
feet of the east side of the highway. There was 4
feet between the Milner car and the Kester car.
The Kester car and trailer occupied the remaining
7 feet 2 inches of the highway.
In response to a direct question by the plaintiff's
attorney, as to the probable point of impact, the
police officer testified that it was indicated by gouge
marks on the highway, (T. 133, 134) and that the
Kester car came to rest 76 feet 4 inches north of the
point of impact. The gouge marks indicated to be the
probable point of impact, were on the hard surfaced
portion of the highway, one gouge 6 feet west of
the east edge of the highway, and the other, 1 foot
5 inches west of the east edge. (T.139, Exhibit P 13)
For the use of the court, and to illustrate the
testimony of the investigating police officer, Appendix 1 is a diagram of the accident scene, showing
the measurements made by the officer, and the position of the vehicles as the scene was set, with the
wrecker facing south with headlights on, the trailer
behind the headlights, being attached to the Kester
vehicle and the east half of the highway blocked.
8
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND ANY NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT, IF FOUND BY THE JURY, WAS NOT AN
INDEPENDENT, SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AND
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTIONS
GIVEN TO THE JURY.

A.

Requested Instruction No. 3 of plaintiff
was Properly Refused by the Court.
C. Instructions Nos. 30, 33, and 34, as Given
by the Court were Proper Instructions under
the Law and Facts of the Case. Plaintiff
did not Except to Instruction No. 34.
B. Instructions Nos. 19, 20, 21, and 22 as
Given by the Court were Proper Instructions under the Law and Facts of the Case.
Plaintiff Failed to Except to Instruction
No. 22.

9
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND ANY NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT, IF FOUND BY THE JURY, WAS NOT AN
INDE-PENDENT, SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT.

At the time of the accident, the wrecker operator had completed operations with the wrecker,
but left it in the middle of the highway, facing
south with headlights burning, while he went over
to assist in attaching the trailer to the Kester automobile, which had been backed into position just
north of the trailer.
The only lights facing toward the south were
those on the wrecker. The Milner car was attached
to the wrecker, with the rear end hoisted and the
front toward the ground, facing north. There were
no taillights on the trailer, and the trailer obscured
the rear of the Kester vehicle, which was facing
north. All the vehicles and people were behind the
wrecker and its headlights. Mr. Kester was holding
a flashlight to illuminate the area between the trailer
and ,the Kester vehicle, and Mrs. Kester was between
the Milner car and the Kester car. No one was.on
the highway warning oncoming motorists of the
vehicles stopped on the roadway behind the wrecker
headlights. The defendant, travelling north, observed headlights facing toward her. She saw a
revolving blue light and assumed it was a wrecker;
hovvever, she saw no flares or lights on the highway,
10
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and nothing to indicate any trouble and assumed
that the wrecker was proceeding toward her. She
did reduce speed by taking her foot off the gas, and
the last time she looked at her speedometer, it indicated 50 miles per hour. With her foot off the gas
she continued to approach the wrecker. As she approached the wrecker, she observed it to be in the
center of the highway, and kno\ving there was sufficient width to pass to the east, turned right. The
trap had been laid; the wrecker, with its headlights
facing south obscuring anything behind it; and the
trailer and the Kester car blocking the highway
~ast of the wrecker. Defendant passed the headlights, saw something, applied brakes, but was unable to stop, and ran into the rear of the trailer.
The speed of the plaintiff one-half mile back would
not be a proximate cause of the accident. Mter
Miss Johnson saw the wrecker apparently approaching, she took her foot of the gas, looked at her
speedometer, and was then travelling 50 miles an
hour, which was within the speed limit.
Appellant, in support of the claim that defendant was negligent, as a matter of law, and her
negligence was an independent, intervening, sole
proximate cause of the accident, has failed to support his contention with any factual situation or any
case similar in fact or law to the case here involved.
Appellant cites several Utah cases, but fails to set
forth the facts of those cases or to point out how
those cases are applicable.
11
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Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d
143, 263 P.2d, 287, was an action for the death of
a guest passenger in an automobile, that struck a
truck parked partially on the highway. The question
in that case was whether the parking of the truck
on the highway was a concurring proximate cause
of the accident. That case specifically holds that
it was a jury question as to whether the negligent
parking of the truck was a proximate cause of the
collision, and that the question of proximate cause
was properly submitted to the jury. As to whether
or not the driver of the car that collided with the
truck was negligent, was held to be a jury question.
The court stated:
"Ordinarily the question of proximate
cause is one of fact for the jury, and not one
of law for the court."
"Where the actor fails to see the danger
in time to avoid it, it is held that a jury
question exists, based on the rational that
it can be reasonably anticipated that circumstances may arise wherein others may not
observe the dangerous condition until too late
to avoid it."
Although the defendant Virginia Johnson saw
a vehicle approaching on the highway with a revolving blue light and assumed it to be a wrecker truck,
there was no fact and no circumstance where she
could observe, and she had no way of knowing there
were other vehicles or persons blocking the highway. The scene was laid, the truck facing south
12
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and it appeared to be approaching toward her and
on its own side of the road. As she approached she
reduced speed to within the speed limit. She got
close to the wrecker and could see it was partially
on the wrong side of the road. She turned to avoid
the wrecker, but as she went past her vision
was obscured and the accident resulted. There
is no evidence in the record that defendant knew,
or could have known that there was anyone on the
highway behind the headlights of the wrecker. She
did not know the situation existed, and could not
know that the eleven foot portion of the east half
of the highwa;y, east of the wrecker, was blocked.
She avoided the wrecker, although she did strike
the open door that extended out two feet. She did
safely pass by that portion of the wrecker that
was visible. The striking of the door was in no way
a cause of the accident..
In the Hillyard v. Utah By-Products case, this
court quotes Medvid v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352,
19 N.W. 2d 788:
"If already at that time, by the negligence
of its driver, the moving vehicle is in such
a position and under such an impetus that an
accident cannot be avoided, the negligence
of the truck driver is as much a proximate
cause of the accident as is the negligence of
the driver of the car; the negligence of each
has contributed to the result."
The Hillyard case states in recongnizing the proposition set forth in the Medvid v. Doolittle, supra,:
13
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"The doctrine enunciated in the above
quotations is based upon the proposition that
one cannot excuse himself from liability arising from his negligent acts merely because
the later negligence of another concurs, to
cause an injury, if the later act was a legally
foreseeable event. ***"
That is the question in this case which was submitted
to the jury. It was a legally forseeable event that a
car might come from the south on the highway and
be unaware of the situation that existed; that is,
that the trailer and the automobiles were blocking
the east half of the highway; and was the failure to
place warning flares or signals out, negligence on the
part of the wrecker opera tor? In this case the question was properly submitted to the jury. It is obvious that the people at the scene realized and
recognized the danger, because the Johnson vehicle
was the only automobile from the south that had
not been warned with a flashlight. Certainly the
other vehicles were able to slow down and avoid a
collision, because when they approached, a person
was sent out with a flashlight to warn them. When
Miss Johnson came there was nothing but a trap
set on the highway.
Appellant cites the case of McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2nd 400, 246 P.2d 711 Appellant does not set forth what circumstances or
under what facts, this case is similar in fact to
14
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the cited case. Respondent contends this case is not
in point and is a completely different fact situation.
That was an appeal to the Supreme Court fro1n a
jury verdict of no cause of action, and the claim
of error was to the court's instruction:
"You are instructed that the driver of
the pickup truck was negligent as a matter
of law, and if you find that she observed
the hazards, if any, of the stopped vehicles
as she approached on the highway, or in the
circumstances should have observed said vehicles, but because of her negligence failed
to do so in time to avoid the accident, then
you are instructed the negligence on her part
was a sole proximate cause of the collision,
and your verdict must be in favor of the defendants against the plaintiff, No Cause of
Action."
In the McMurdie vs. Underwood case, the court
reviewed Hillyard v. Utah By-Products, 1 Utah 2d,
143, 263 P.2d 287, and states:
"In applying the test to foreseeability of
the situations where a negligently created
pre-existing condition combines with a later
act of negligence, causing an injury, the
courts have drawn a clear cut distinction between the two classes of cases. First situation
is where one has negligently created a dangerous situation such as parking the truck, and
the later actor observed, or circumstances are
such that he could not fail to observe, but
negligently failed to avoid it. The second
situation involves conduct of a later intervening actor who negligently failed to observe
15
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the dangerous condition and too late to avoid
it. In regard to the first situation, it is held
as a matter of law that the later intervening
act does interrupt the natural sequence of
events and cut off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial actor."
By the court's own quotation, in order for a
later intervening act to be an independent intervening sole proxin1ate cause, there must be a dangerous
condition and a later act observed or circumstances
are such that he could not fail to observe. We submit
that in this case there is not one fact or circun1stance
that shows that defendant observed, or could have
observed, the situation of cars blocking the highway
north of the wrecker, with no lights or flares out,
and no warnings. Defendant had a right to assume,
and did assume, that the wrecker was approaching
her on its own side of the road, or that it would
return to its own side of the road. By the time
she could tell that it was stopped and was not going
to move to its own side of the road, she had her
car under control and passed, to the right of the
wrecker, but ran into the hidden trailer. There
is no evidence there was any dangerous situation
that she could have observed. The McMurdie v.
Underwood case was submitted to the jury for determination of the various questions and facts involved.
Appellant did not submit to the court any instruction to have the jury determine whether or not
the circumstances were such that the defendant
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should have observed, or could not fail to observe
the dangerous situation.
Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, 366 P.2d 989,
Utah 2d 379, is not in point. In that case the facts
were substantially different. A driver of a bus
struck a large well-lighted truck parked upon
the highway when there was at least one and onehalf usable lanes of traffic to the left of the truck.
The court held that the negligence of the bus driver
in striking the truck was sole proximate cause of
the collision. In that case the bus driver saw the
truck, had all the time necessary to avoid striking
the truck parked on the highway, but proceeded
down the highway and hit the truck. The court
held that the negligence of the bus driver in striking
the truck when he saw it, and knew it was there,
and had time to avoid it, was an independent, sole
intervening act of negligence. That case is in fact
greatly different from our case. If Miss Johnson
had struck the wrecker as it was setting on the
highway, her conduct in striking the wrecker may
have been an independent intervening act; but she
saw the wrecker with its headlights facing her, she
had control of her car, there was a usable part of
the highway, approximately eleven feet wide to
her right. She did avoid the wrecker that was
on the highway and passed around it, except
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for the striking of the open door, which could not
be seen behind the headlights.
None of the cases quoted in the plaintiff's Point
I are in point ·with the facts and circumstances in this
case. The trail court submitted to the jury the question of the defendant's negligence, and under instructions and the theories as requested by the plaintiff.
The evidence is uncontradicted, that as the defendant
Virginia Johnson drove north, and observed the
lights of the vehicle coming from the north, she
assumed that the same was travelling on its own
side of the highway. This assumption is well founded and supported by case law.
In Barnes v. Ashworth, Va., 153 S.E. 2d 711,
a motorist stopped his car on the wrong side of the
highway on a rainy night, with lights on, and left
it in this position, it was held to be negligence as
a matter of law, and would preclude recovery by
the driver. The case held the person approaching
did not realize the car was parked on the wrong
side of the road, until nearly upon it, and
then swung to the right and collided with a car
stopped on the right side, which was without lights
and which the driver did not see. This case is similar
to our case. The court held the one stopping on the
wrong side of the highway, was negligent as a
matter of law, and his negligence was a proximate
cause of his injury and death.
At 70 A.L.R. 1021 is an annotation holding:
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"The driver of an automobile on a pu'Qlic
highway at night who sees in front of him
the headlights of another car facing him has
the right to assume that such car is in motion
and will be operating and conform with the
law of the road, and the driver approaching
cannot be charged with contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to stop or
discover that the other car is stopped or discovered that the other car is stalled on its
left of the center of the highway in such a
position that there was no approaching room
for the car to pass on the proper side, until
it was too late to avoid the collision."
Hatch v. Daniels, Vermont, 117 A. 105, held:
"One driving an automobile on a public
road who sees a car approaching on the highway has the right at the outset to assume it
will observe the law of the road and will move
to its right, and the driver may proceed on
this assumption, and it is a jury question as to
under what circumstances the approaching
driver should realize the other car is or will
remain on the wrong side of the highway."
Padgett v. Brangan, Kentucky, 15 S.W. Sec.
277, held:
"A party has a right to assume when
approaching in the nighttime, a car parked
on the wrong side of the road with its headlights on facing him that the car is on its own
side of the road."
Bradley v. Clarke, Kentucky, 293 S.W. 2d 1082,
held a plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as
a matter of law, when he approached a stopped
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truck with its lights on, and drove to the right of
the truck, thinking that the truck was moving, and
then discovered the situation that there was a parked car behind the truck lights, swung around to the
wrong side and struck a wrecked car, which he
could not see until too late to avoid it.
The case of Doane v. Smith, Calif., 147 P.2d
650 held:
"It cannot be said as a matter of law at
what definite distance from parked vehicles
at which an approaching driver must realize
the vehicle is standing still, in order to be
free of negligence, and it cannot be said that
a plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law
in failing to realize the truck was standing
still until he was within 100 feet of it. It must
be remembered that automobile drivers have
the right to anticipate the standing vehicles
ahead of them will be parked off the highway
if it is practical to park there, and has the
right to act upon that assumption until there
is some reasonable grounds for believing there
is some vehicle ahead that is not so parked."
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AND
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT.

At the time this accident occured,- Mr. Taylor
had hooked onto the Milner automobile, was in a
position to move off the highway, but went to where
the trailer was being attached to the Kester car,
and was assisting Kester and Milner in attaching
the trailer to the car. There was no rescue operation
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or any em-ergency that required the wrecker operator to assist Mr. Kester and Mr. Milner.
Although the defendant admitted she saw the
wrecker when she was approximately a half mile
away, and saw a revolving blue light, no warning
devices, flares, fusees, pot lights were out on the
highway. Counsel for appellant states that it seems
unlikely that the failure to place flares would be
of any consequence. Defendant testified that she
looked for flares or warnings and saw none. All
she saw were headlights approaching, with a revolving blue light which she assumed to be a wrecker
moving on its own side of the road. There was
no indication or warning of any trouble ahead on
the roadway.
The appellant contends this case is similar to
the Velasquez vs. Greyhound case, supra but the
facts are much different. In that case, the driver
of the bus did see the truck parked on the
half of the highway to pass and intended to turn
out, but claimed a blackout for some reason or
another, and ran into the plainly visible bus. In this
case, Miss Johnson did not run in to the wrecker. The
collision was with the trailer, hidden behind the
headlights of the wrecker.
Appellant calls attention to the fact that all the
other drivers coming from the south were able to
bring their cars under control, and passed around
the blockade. The evidence was that every car that
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approached from the south, prior to the time Miss
Johnson approached, had been warned with a signal
by flashlight. The Johnson car was the only
one not warned. Appellant states that defendant
argues that Taylor, after attaching the auto to
the wrecker, had time to remove the vehicles off
the highway. Defendant contended that after the
Milner car was attached to the wrecker, the wrecker
could have moved off the highway in such a position
that Mr. Taylor would have been in no danger and
the wrecker out of the way so that its headlights
were not blinding oncoming traffic, and the headlights of the Johnson car could have, and would
have picked up the objects on the highway in front
of her, and the accident could have been avoided.
Mr. Taylor had flares, fusees and reflectorized
stands, and none of these were put out on the
highway. The trap was laid when he left the truck
facing south and no warning signals out and Taylor
was behind the headlights where northbound drivers
couldn't see. The headlights of the wrecker did not
constitute warning lights. The record fails to show,
and appellant does not quote any law or case to
indicate that a blue light on the top of the vehicle
is any type of a warning light.
Appellant contends plaintiff's decedent was not
guilty of any contributory negligence. Instruction
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No. 18 given by the court, is a requested instruction
of the plaintiff, and covers contributory negligence.
The issue of contributory negligence was submitted
to the jury pursuant to a requested instruction by
the defendant, and pursuant to a requested instruction on contributory negligence by the plaintiff. As
this court said in the case of Mann vs. Fairbourn,
12, Utah 2nd. 342, 366 P.2d 603:
"If the instruction and theory of law
were improper, it would come within the rule
of invited error."
In that case, the plaintiff had asked for instruction
on contributory negligence of a child, and then later
complained to the court in submitting the matter of
contributory negligence to the jury, this court said:
"The plaintiff did not request an instruction to the effect that a child under six years
of age could not be guilty of contributory
negligence, and instruction No.6 of which he
now complains is substance the same as his
requested instruction No. 3. Under such circumstances, the instruction, if erroneous,
would come within the rule of invited error,
of which the plaintiff cannot here avail himself."
The court in making this state1nent cites Alvarez
vs. Paulus,-8 Utah 2d 283,333 P.2d 633, and Pettingill
vs. Perkins, 2 Utab 2nd. 66, 272 P .2d 185.
The plaintiff asked the court specifically to
instruct the jury on contributory negligence, and
plaintiff cannot now complain.
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Appellant has failed to cite any case or law in
support of the contention that the plaintiff's decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Appellant claims that if the plaintiff was negligent, such negligence was not a proximate cause of
the accident. Appellant cites the Velasquez vs. Greyhound Lines case, Supra, in the support of the claim.
In the previous point we have discussed the case of
Velasquez vs. Greyhound Bus Lines as not in point,
not similar in fact, in law, of the point herein involved.
The negligence on the part of the plaintiff was
his failure to place flares or other warning devices
on the highway, his failure to move the wrecker off
of the highway when he had sufficient time to do
so, from five to twenty minutes; and his failure to
keep a lookout for his own safety.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, and when
plaintiff's counsel took exception to the court's instruction, appellants counsel candidly stated:
"That the only question with respect to
negligence which should have been submitted
to the jury was whether or not the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence and
which said contributory negligence, if any,
was a proximate cause of the injuries claimed.
This, of course, does not intend to exclude
the submission to the jury the damages questioned."(?:- 2 ")_ ~)
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No exception was taken by plaintiff to instruction No. 18 given by the court, which submitted the
issue of contributory negligence to the jury. The
plaintiff could not except to this instruction as he
made the request for the instruction and never withdrew the same. Instruction No. 17 given by the
court was an instruction concerning contributory
negligence and its effect, defeating the claim of the
plaintiff. There was no exception taken to this
instruction and no objection to the jury being instructed upon that theory of the case. Appellant's
counsel, now before the court, claims that it was
error to submit the matter of contributory negligence to the jury. At the time of the trial he did
not object to that matter going to the jury, and in
effect stated that it was appropriate for the jury,
and requested an instruction on that defense.
Appellant contends it ·would not be negligence
on the part of Taylor, to stop on the traveled
portion of the highway longer than a reasonable
length of time or to occupy more of the highway than
was reasonably necessary or fail to warn approaching traffic by lights designated by the Utah Road
Commission, or by other lights, flares, or practical
means, if his vehicle was not equipped with lights
designated by the Utah Road Commission. Instruction No. 26 was a requested instruction by the plaintiff, and there was no exception taken by plaintiff.
The plaintiff had the jury instructed that it was the
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duty of the defendant not to stop on the traveled
portion of the highway longer than a reasonable
length of time, and not to occupy more of the highway than was reasonably necessary, and to reasonably warn approaching traffic of the obstruction on
the roadway by lights designated by the Utah State
Road Commission or by other lights, flares or practical means, if his vehicle was not equipped with
lights designated by the Utah Highway Commission.
The record is void of evidence that the Utah
State Highway Commission at any time designated
any lights for wreckers. Admittedly, the statute
allows the U tab State Road Commission to designate, but there is no evidence in the record as to
what, if any lights have ever been designated for
wreckers, by the Utah State Road Commission.
Evidence in the case was sufficient to have a
jury find that Taylor failed to keep a proper lookout
for his own safety, failed to place out any warning
lights and signals, and obstructed the highway and
left his vehicle facing south with its lights obscuring
what was behind and interfering with oncoming
traffic.
Cases are many holding that it is negligence for
a person to stop a vehicle on the highway, with
lights facing oncoming traffic, and failing to place
out warning signs. Gutierrez, et al vs. Koury, 57
N.M. 741 263, P.2d 557, held that even though the
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driver of a truck did not have a statutory duty to
put flares or other lights on the highway to warn
motorists when he, because of ignition trouble, stopped his truck on the highway at night, the truck
driver owed the duty to motorists to exercise reasonable care to warn him of their peril and his failure
to do so would constitute negligence which was
the proximate cause of injury sustained by motorists
when an auto ran into the rear of the stopped truck.
The case held, in the absence of notice to the contrary, a motorist has the right to assume that the lane
of traffic in which he is travelling is free from
obstruction, and if not, that one responsible for its
blockade would give adequate and proper warning
thereof, and he is not bound to anticipate that
a truck driver would leave the truck standing in
the middle of the paved portion of the highway
unattended, without lights.
Frame vs. Arrow Towing Service, 64 P.2d 1312,
Ore., held that there was common law duty of the
operator of a tow car working on the scene of a
wrecked automobile to place a sign on the roadway
warning oncoming traffic of obstruction of the highway, and the failure to put out signals would estab..
lish a prima facie case of negligence against such
operator. Callison vs. Dondero, 124 P.2d 852, held
that where a defendant's vehicle was equipped with
flame pots and the defendant failed to use the flame
pots or otherwise warn drivers of the plaintiff's
truck, might be properly considered in determining
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whether the defendant was guilty of a failure to
exercise ordinary care, although the defendant may
not have violated a statute by failing to place the
flame pots or other warning signals on the highway
after he parked his truck on the highway.
In Early vs. Jackson, 243 P.2d 444, 120 Utah
464, the defendant had parked his car on the
highway, at nighttime partially off the road and
no flares were placed to warn oncoming traffic
of the obstruction. The headlights were left burning facing slightly to the northwest, so that a driver
was not able to determine until he was within 250 to
300 feet of the parked truck, that it was obstructing
one en tire lane of traffic. The Utah Supreme Court
held, as a matter of law, that the one who parked
the truck was negligent and stated:
"The driver of appellant's car was confronted with an emergency of respondent's
making and was in a worse position than
respondent, who knew of the danger at all
times, to avoid the accident."
The Supreme Court held the lower Court erred in
failing to grant appellant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. In this case, the Supreme Court recognized that it would be negligence
to stop a car on the highway at night, without flares
or lights to warn of blocking the lane of traffic.
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See also Fortman v. McBride, Iowa, 263 N.W.
345, which held that a decedent was contributorily
negligent as a rna tter of law in trying to push his
car while it was blocking one side of the roadway
and while his back was to oncoming traffic, was
devoting his entire attention to attempting to move
his car, when he must have known from the headlights of the defendant's automobile that a car was,
approaching and he could have seen it and failed to
watch and move.
The case of Ashe vs. Hughes, Mississippi, 69 So.
2d 210, where a wrecker parked on the highway,
while assisting a disabled vehicle, was held not subject to the statute requiring flares to be put out
because the wrecker was not disabled, but the plaintiff in the action, who was suing the wrecker, because
of colliding with the same, had the right to have
submitted to the jury, under the proper instruction,
the question of whether the failure to use flares
was common law negligence. Gonyo vs. Hewson,
162 N.Y. Supp. 2d 304, held even though there was
no statutory duty to place flares in the daytime,

29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

there was a common law duty for a truck operator
to put flares which were available in his truck while
it was stopped on the highway during a snowstorm.
Gaber vs. Weinberg, Pa., 188 A. 187, held that it was
a jury question and might be a common law duty
in the exercise of reasonable care, for the operator
of a truck to warn approaching motorists by the use
of flares or other signals when stopped on the highway. Vandenack vs. Crosby, Wisconsin, 82 N.W. 2d
307, held that a wrecker truck was engaged in an
emergency rescue operation, did not excuse the
driver's failure to place flares on the highway.
The court held the operators of such trucks must
exercise ordinary care to warn other traffic of the
obstruction of the highway, and particularly where
the truck had been stopped for some period of time.
An Idaho case, Baldwin vs. Mittry, 102 P.2d
643, held that although a statute did not make
it obligatory for a wrecker operator to use flares
on the highway, that the failure of ,a wrecker
operator to put flares on the highway raised a jury
question as to whether or not the operator of the
wrecker had exercised ordinary care under the circumstances. Whitworth v. Riley, Okla. 269 P. 350 held
that a person who drives his automobile to the left
of the center of the public highway in the nighttime,
and becomes stalled in a position that would not
permit passage of an automobile travelling in the
opposite direction to the right, and so stands
with the headlights on to indicate a moving car,
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constitutes prima facie evidence of the negligence
of the driver thereof, in event of collision by another
automobile who by virtue of the rules of the road
had the right to assume from the facts the headlights
were on, that the stalled car was in motion and was
being operated in conformity with the law. In Edblad vs. Brewer, Minnesota, 227 N.W. 493 a driver
who had stopped late at night, on his right side of
the highway to change a tire and defendant, passing
in the opposite direction stopped to offer assistance
and backed his car behind the stopped car so that
the headlights on the defendant's car were facing
forward on the wrong side of the road and an approaching car driver deceived and collided with
the front of the car of the defendant, resulting in
plaintiff's injuries. The court said in affirming the
judgment for the plaintiff who had struck the car
that was stopped:
"We think it is so clear the law of the
road forbids stopping as where the appellant
did that we shall not discuss the assignment
of error on the part of the charge to advise
the jury that it was negligent to do so, and
that such negligence was a :_eroximate cause
of the collision that was liability, unless contributory negligence of the plaintiff was
involved."
Padgett vs. Brangan, Kentucky, 15 S.W. 2d, 277,
held a defendant negligent as a matter of law
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. in parking his truck on the left side of the road
with the lights on at night. Barnes vs. Ashworth,
Va., 153 S.E. 2nd 711, held that one stopping his car
on the wrong side of the road on a rainy night, with
the lights on is negligent as a matter of law.
Cooper vs. Teter, 15 S.E. 2d 152 West Va., held
that a wrecker truck being used to restore a wrecked
automobile to the highway may stand on the traveled portion of the highway for a reasonable length
of time but must not occupy more highway than
is reasonably necessary, and approaching traffic
must be fully warned to the obstruction by lights,
flags, guards or all other practical means.
Blashfield Encyclopedia Automobile Law, Vol.
2A, Sec. 1202, page 50, states:
"Irrespective for the reason for stopping
the vehicle on the highway the driver is under
a reasonable care to give proper and adequate
warning to other motorists who may be using
the highway."
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Rasing vs. H eazler, Kan., 142 P.2d 832, held
that a defendant, stopped on the highway supplied
with flame pots or flares, his failure to use then1
might be considered negligence, although his failure
was not a violation of the statutes for the reason
that the truck was not disabled.
Respondent respectfully contends that there
was clear evidence of the negligence of the plaintiff's
decedent in failing to put out any warning lights,
when he had them, and in working between the
trailer and the car under the situation set up
when the trailer and the Kester car were behind
the lights, and leaving his wrecker on the highway
facing the wrong way to mislead the oncoming
drivers, who had a right to assume that it was
moving and on its own side of the highway. By the
time the oncoming driver could determine that the
vehicle was not moving or was not on its own side
of the highway an emergency situation had arisen,
and defendant, with the car under control, drove to
her right and passed to the side where there was
sufficient width of the highway, and came into the
situation that had been set up and, which had been
obscurred from her vision, because the headlights
of the wrecker faced directly down the road. There
was sufficient facts for the jury to determine that
the plaintiff's decedent was negligent. The case was
properly submitted to the jury upon the theory of
negligence, and contributory negligence. There was
never any objection fro1n the attorney for the ap33
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pellant, to the submission of the case to the jury on
the matter of contributory negligence of the plaintiff's decedent.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTI0'N"S
GIVEN TO THE JURY.

A.

Requested Instruction No. 3 of plaintiff
was Properly Refused by the Court.
B. Instructions Nos. 19, 20, 21, and 22 as
Given by the Court were Proper Instructions under the Law and Facts of the Case.
Plaintiff Failed to Except to Instruction
No. 22.
C. Instructions Nos. 30, 33, and 34, as Given
by the Court were Proper Instructions under
the Law and Facts of the Case. Plaintiff
did not Except to Instruction No. 34.
Appellant's counsel makes a blanket complaint
to the court's instructions as a whole and states
they are contradictory; serve to over emphasize
particular aspects of the case; permit the jury to
speculate; are indefinite; and prejudicial to the
plaintiff. Appellant fails to advise in what particulars the instructions were contradictory; how they
over emphasized particular aspects of the case; how
they permitted the jury to speculate; how they were
indefinite; and how they were prejudicial to plaintiff. The all inclusive complaint about the instructions, without specifying the particulars of the alleged error and with no law to support the bald
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claims of error, makes it difficult to know of what
plaintiff complains. With no specification as to the
contradiction; over emphasis; speculation; indefiniteness; and prejudice, the claim of error in appellant's point three opening paragraph lacks merit.
It should not be incumbent upon respondent to
answer bald claims of error made without specification or particular.
Appellant complains of the failure of the court
to grant a directed verdict for the plaintiff, on the
issue of liability. There was no exception to the
court's refusal to instruct the jury to return a vercict in favor of the plaintiff. The motion by plaintiff or a directed verdict was made with no reason
or basis specified. The court refused to so instruct
the jury, plaintiff failed to except to the failure to
instruct the jury in accordance with the request to
return a verdict of liability for plaintiff, and plaintiff has wavied any objection to the failure of the
court to so instruct the jury on the liability issue.
Appellant takes the position that the only question which should have been submitted to the jury,
was the question of damages, and the court should
have directed a verdict for plaintiff At the time of
taking of exceptions to the jury, counsel for plaintiff stated into the record:
"That the only question with respect to
negligence which should have been submitted
to the jury was whether or not the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence and
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which contributory negligence, if any, was a
proximate cause of the injuries claimed."
(T. 226).
Counsel cannot now logically contend that the
court should have directed a verdict for plaintiff,
when for the record, he stated that the issue of negligence of the plaintiff's decedent, and proximate
cause, were questions for the jury.
A.

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.3 WAS PROPERLY REFUSED BY THE COURT.
Plaintiffs requested Instruction No. 3 was a
request that the court instruct the jury, as a matter
of law, that defendant had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident. The instruction requested was:
"The defendant has admitted that she
saw the lights of the wrecker at a time when
she was a approximately one-half mile away
and that she recognized that it was a wrecker
at that time. She also has admitted that she
continued toward the wrecker without materially slowing her car by application of brakes
until she was within
feet of the car.
She has also admitted that she could not see
ahead of the lights that were on the wrecker
and that it was her intention to go around
that vehicle although she could not see ahead.
She therefore had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident. In these circumstances
any act of negligence on the part of the plaintiffs' decedent, that is on the part of Mr.
James Warner Taylor, would not bar recovery
by the plaintiffs."
Under the facts of the case, the theory of last
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clear chance was not applicable. In any event, the
requested instruction fails to embody the proper
elements of the theory of last clear chance, and is
erroneous in that it requests the court to hold as a
matter of law, that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident. Appellant relies upon
the case of Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah 2nd 174, 350 P.2d
154, as authority that his requested Instruction No.
3 should have been given. The Fox v. Taylor case
is directly contrary to the appellant's position that
the case should have been submitted to the jury
upon the theory of last clear chance. As stated by
the court in Fox v. Taylor:
"The cases where that doctrine is applicable fall into two distinct categories. The
first we here consider, relates to situations
where both the defendant and the plaintiff
are guilty of continuing negligence, and
where the plaintiff could, by exercising due
care, avoid the peril at any time up to the
moment of injury. In such case, the injury
is the result of the concurring negligence .of
both the plaintiff and the defendant. Under
those facts the defendant can be held responsible only if he actually knows of the plaintiff's
situation of peril in time to have the last
clear chance to avoid the harm, and fails to
do so.
"The plaintiff insists, however, that the
doctrine of last clear chance is applicable and
the defendant should be held liable even if he
did not see her, because in the exercise of due
care he should have observed and avoided
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striking her. This contention involves consideration of the other facet of the doctrine of
last clear chance. Where the defendant does
not actually know of the plaintiff's situation
of peril, the doctrine can only be properly
applied where the plaintiff has gotten into a
position of inextricable peril. An illustration
of this is where a person has caught his foot
in a railroad switch, or is in some other similar predicament, so that he is thereafter unable to avert the injury. In such a situation,
the plaintiff's negligence has come to rest."
The requested instruction by plain tiff does not
enco1npass the legal principles necessary to properly
instruct a jury on the theory of last clear chance,
and as such principles are set forth in the cas·e of
Fox v. Taylor, supra, and the Utah cases cited
therein.
The defendant Virginia Johnson did not know
of the Mr. Taylor's situation, and therefore the situation did not con1e under the first category of last
clear chance as set forth by the Utah Court in Fox
v. Taylor, supra.
There is no claim or evidence in the record,
that the James Warner Taylor was in an extricable
peril situation. The oncoming vehicle was visible for
one-half mile, from the south. Taylor was working
between the trailer and Kester automobile with Mr.
Milner and Mr. Kester. (T. 24-25) There were no
flares, signs or warnings out. (T. 28) A look to the
south would have indicated a vehicle approaching
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and allowed him to move off the road. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Taylor was
in a position of inextricable peril and allow the doctrine of last clear chance to be applied under the
second category set forth in Fox v. Taylor, Supra.
Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that would
support a last clear chance instruction to be submitted to the jury in this case.
B.

INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 19, 20, 21, and 22
WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO
THE JURY.
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provides:
"Instructions to Jury: Objections. No
party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto. In objecting to the giving of an in-struction, a party must state distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the grounds
for his objection."
There was no exception by plaintiff to Instruction No. 22.
Plaintiff complains of Instruction No. 19. The
instruction was:
"Everyone who has driven an automobile
in the nighttime and every observant person
who has ridde in an automobile in the nighttime and has met an oncoming automobile
with burning lights, knows that the lights
obscure objects behind it for a distance before
the auotmobile is reached until a time after its
lights are passed."
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This instruction was proper. The wrecker operator left his vehicle in the center of the road, facing
south, with headlights on. The fact that it was
moving or stopped would not change the fact that
headlights would obscure objects behind the headlights. This instruction was specifically approved
by the Utah Supreme Court in the cases of Fretz v.
Anderson, 5 Utah 2nd 290, 300 P.2d 642, and Federated Milk Producers Association, etc. v. Statewide
Plumbing and Heating Company, 11 Utah 2nd 295,
358 p .2d 348.
Instruction No. 20 given by the court was:
"A driver of a motor vehicle is not expected to he capable of acting instantaneously
upon seeing danger, as the law takes notice
of the fact that it takes a certain time for the
driver's eyes, mind and muscular system to
act, and for the brakes of the car to be applied
thereafter. This period of time is known as
reaction time. While it is generally recognized
that the average time of the normal person
to react at first recognizing and realizing
danger in the daytime and under ordinary
conditions is approximately % of a second,
you are entitled to consider the fact that such
time may vary somewhat with the particular
individual and with all the attendant circumstances and conditions at the time and place
of the accident."
It was a proper instruction and applicable to
the general facts and situation in the case. It is
not prejudicial to the plaintiff and is the reiteration
of a well-established fact of which the court may
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take judicial knowledge. Howa1·d v. Ringsby Truck
Lines, 2 Utah 2nd 65, 269 P .2d 295.
Instruction No. 21 was:
"You are hereby instructed that the law
did not require the said Virginia Claire Johnson to anticipate or guard against anything
which could not reasonably be expected and
did not require her to regulate her conduct
with reference to any conduct on the part of
James W. Taylor, not reasonably to be expected, nor did the law require Virginia Clair
Johnson to be extraordinarily alert or to foresee all that can be seen by looking backward
after the accident happened. In other words,
the said Virginia Johnson was not under a
duty to foresee all that she might at this time
be able to see or appreciate by lookino back
at the accident; nor was she required to use
extraordinary caution for the avoidance of
an accident that she could not have expected
under the circumstances.
"In this connection, you are further instructed that if the said Virginia Johnson
could not, in the exercise of ordinary care,
under the circumstance avoided a collision,
then plaintiffs cannot recover and if you so
find, your verdict should be in favor of defendant and against the plaintiffs."
This is a correct statement of the "hindsight
rule" and was not prejudicial to the plaintiff.
This instruction is in substance from the Utah
Supreme Court decision of Olsen v. W arwood, 123
Utah 111, 255 P.2d 725.
Instruction No. 22 was:
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"If you find that the defendant was a
person who, without negligence on her part,
is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with
peril, arisig from either the actual presence,
or the appearance, of imminent danger to
herself or to others, then she is not expected,
nor required, to use the same judgment and
prudence that is required of her, in the exercise of ordinary care, in calmer and more
deliberate moments. Her duty is to exercise
only the care that ordinarliy prudent persons
would exercise in the same situation. If at the
moment she does what appears to her to be
the best thing to do, and if her choice and
manner of action are the same as might have
been followed by an ordinarily prudent person
under the same conditions, she does all the
law requires of her, although, in the light of
after-events, it should appear that a different
court would have been better and safer."
This is the emergency doctrine set forth by the
Utah Supreme Court in Howard vs. Ringsby Truck
Lines, 2 Utah 2d 65, 269 P .2d 295.
This is a correct statement of the doctrine as
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. The instruction does not tell the jury that an emergency exist'3d,
but -left it for the jury to determine from the facts,
and the instruction was proper and correctly submitted to the jury.
The appellant has submitted no law to support
the claim that the giving of lnstruciton Nos. 19, 20,
21 and 22 was erroneous, as to any, or all of said
instructions. We assume that appellant, not sup42
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porting his claim of error with any law, could find
none to support his contentions that said instructions were erroneous. /
C.

INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 30, 3'3, and 34 AS
GIVEN BY THE COURT WERE PROPER INSTRUCTIONS UNDER THE LAW
AND FACTS OF THE CASE. PLAINTIFF
DID NOT EXCEPT TO INSTRUCTION
34.
Plaintiff contends that Instruction Nos. 30, 33
and 34 given by the court were erroneous. A blanket
charge of error is made to these instructions. No
exception to instruction No. 34 appears in the record.
In argument that Instruction Nos. 30, 33 and
34 w·ere erroneous and prejudicial, appellant states
no law to aid the court or respondent in determining
in what particulars said instructions are claimed to
be erroneous and prejudicial.
Instruction No. 30 stated:
"One who places himself in a dangerous
position has the duty to use his faculties for
hearing and seeing to avoid being struck by
vehicles upon the highway. If you find from
a preponderance of the evidence that James
W. Taylor was working in a dangerous position between the Milner trailer and the Kester automobile and further find from a preponderance of the evidence that James W.
Taylor did not use reasonable care to watch
for the approach of vehicles on the highway,
and there were no flares or other warning
signals placed on the highway to warn motorists approaching from the south, then you
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may find James W. Taylor was negligent, and
plaintiffs cannot recover if such lack of
reasonable care was a proximate cause of the
collision."
This instruction is a correct statement of the
law, as to one who is in a dangerous situation being
required to use his faculties to avoid injury. Taylor
was working between an automobile and a trailer,
on the main traveled highway. His wrecker was
facing south, with the headlights obscuring the highway behind the wrecker. It is undisputed that there
were no flares or signals on the highway. The
wrecker operator on the scene for one-half hour or
1nore, and his wrecker equipped with flares, fuses,
and reflectorized stands, failed to use these warning
devices to protect himself and others on the highway. The defendant did not strike the wrecker on
the highway, but defendant passed to the side of
it, with sufficient room on the east side for passage,
but the east portion of the highway, behind the headlights, was blocked.
Instruction No. 33 was a correct statement of
the law for the jury under the facts of this case.
The instruction is proper and supported by the evidence and law. This instruction was as follows:
"Although the driver of a wrecker may be
excused for stopping on the highway while
actively engaged in removing wrecked or disabled vehicles, the wrecker operator must use
reasonable care and diligence in moving his
wrecker from the highway if he has sufficent
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opportunity to do so. You are instructed that
a wrecker truck being used to pick up or
restore a damaged vehicle on the highway
may stand on the traveled portion of the
highway only for the reasonable length of
tim·e necessary to do the work, but must not
occupy more of the highway than is reasonably necessary and approaching traffic must
be fully warned of the obstruction by the use
of lights, flags, guards or any other practical
means. Remaining on the traveled portion of·
the highway for a period of time longer than
reasonably necessary to remove a wrecked or
damaged vehicle may constitute negligence
and the failure to warn approaching traffic of
the obstruction by lights, flags, guards or any
other practical means may also constitute negligence on the part of the wrecker operator."
Plaintiff complains that this instruction does
not take into consideration proximate cause. The
instruction only went to the duty of the wrecker
operator remaining on the highway and as to the
use of flares or signals when he remained on the
highway. The matter of whether or not such negligence, if any the jury found, was a proxhnate
cause of the accident, was covered in other instructions of the court, particularly Instruction Nos. 17
and 18. Proximate cause is properly covered in those
instructions and it is not necessary that the instruction as to negligence contains the element of proximate cause. Instruction No. 33 does not tell the jury
that if they find the wrecker driver negligent, then
plaintiff could not recover. The instruction covers
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negligent conduct, and not conclusions or effect of
negligence on the part of the wrecker operator.
Instruction No. 23 was as follows:
"The operator of a vehicle stopped on the
highway at night time owes a duty to oncoming motorists to exercise reasonable care to
warn them of the peril and the obstruction
of the highway. If you find from a preponder
ance of the evidence that James W. Taylor
did not use ordinary care and diligence to
warn oncoming motorists of the obstruction
on the east half of the highway where the
collision occurred, and if you further find
that such negligence was a proximate cause
of the collision, then you may find James W.
Taylor was negligent and you may return a
verdict for the defendant and against the
plaintiffs, no cause of action."
This instruction with all the instructions is a
correct instruction on defendant's theory that James
W. Taylor failed to exercise reasonable care to warn
oncoming motorists of the obstruction on the highway, and that such failure, if found to be a proximate cause of the accident, would bar plaintiff's recovery.
Instructions 30, 33 and 34 are separate instructions, and different defenses and theories of the
defendant's case. Instruction No. 33 covers the situation of the wrecker operator being in a dangerous
situation on the highway, with no flares or signals
to warn oncoming motorists, and covers his duty to
use his faculties for hearing and seeing to avoid
46
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being struck by automobiles approaching.
Instruction No. 33 covers the situation of the
driver removing his wrecker from the highway
after his work is completed, and if leaving it on the
highway, of the exercise of ordinary care in using
flares or lights, flags or other warning devices.
Instruction No. 34 is a general instruction of
the duty to exercise reasonable care, and proximate
cause.
Plaintiff complains that Instruction No. 25 is
in conflict with Instruction Nos. 30 and 33. Instruction No. 25, requested by plaintiff, is not in conflict,
as the evidence in the case clearly indicates that at
the time of the accident, the wrecker was not being
used to remove a stalled vehicle from the highway.
The wrecker operator had completed his work of
attaching the Milner car to the wrecker and then,
rather than moving off the highway, he went over
to work on the trailer hitch. At the time of the
accident, the wrecker was parked on the highway
and was not being used to remove a stalled vehicle
from the highway.
Cases are many that it is negligence for a person to work on the highway at night without placing
flares or warning devices to warn oncoming motorists, and that one working on a highway at night
must keep a lookout for oncoming vehicles.
Callison v. Dondero, California 124 P.2d 852,
held that a defendant truck driver who stopped his
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truck on the paved portion of the highway, and the
truck equipped with flame pots, the failure of the
defendant to use the flame pots to warn oncoming
drivers, might properly be considered in determining if the defendant exercised ordinary care, although defendant may not have violated any statute by failing to place flame pots or other warning
·
signals on the highway.
Frame v. Arrow Towing Service, 64 P.2d 1312,
Oregon, held that the failure of the operator of a tow
car to place signs or signal on the roadway warning
of the highway obstruction, would establish a prima
facie case of negligence against the operator. See
also Ashe v. Hughes, Mississippi, 69 So. 2d 210; Gonyo
v. Hewson, New York, 162 N.Y.S. Supp. 2d 304;
Gaber v. Wienberg, Penn., 188 A. 187; Vandenack v.
Crosby, Wisconsin, 82 N.E. 2d 307; Smith v. Litron,
La., 47 So. 2d 411; Cooper v. Teter, 15 S.E. 2d 152,
West Virginia; Robinson v. Briggs Transportation
Co., Wisconsin, 76 N.W. 2d 294.
Many cases held that where a man is working
on the highway, on a stalled or disabled automobile,
that the worker has the duty to pay attention to oncoming traffic. Descombaz v. Klock, South Dakota,
240 N. W. 495, involved a motorist stopped on the
highway because of a flat tire. His car lights were
on and another vehicle hit him from the rear. The
plaintiff was found negligent as a matter of law in
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failing to keep a proper lookout to avoid injury from
moving traffic. The court said:
"Had plaintiff given any lookout for defendant's car approaching with headlights
plainly visible, there we would have plenty
of time for him to step out from in front of
his car after it became apparent that a collision from the rear would occur."
The court in that decision set out that if plaintiff
saw and failed to act prudently, he was negligent,
and if he failed to look he was negligent for failure
to keep any lookout. The following cases hold that
one working on a disabled vehicle on the highway
at night, has the duty to keep a proper lookout for
oncoming vehicles. Binette, Admd. v. LePage,
Maine, 123 A. 2nd 711; Underwriters v. E·mployers
Liability Ins. Co., 28 So. 2d 118; Fortman v. McBride,
263 N.W. 345; Dragotis v. Kennedy, Minnesota, 250
N.W.

~04.

There was a factual question presented for the
jury as to whether or not the decedent James Warner
Taylor left his wrecker unnecessarily long on the
highway blocking a portion of the east lane and obstructing the vision of oncoming traffic. After Taylor had hooked onto the Milner vehicle, he had sufficient time to move the wrecker off the highway, place
out flares to warn oncoming traffic, and put his
wrecker in such a position that the headlights did
not blind oncoming traffic. In the case of Harry
Holder Motor Co. v. Davidson, Kenutcky, 243 S.W.
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2d 926, it has held that the driver of a wrecker
should not stop upon the traveled portion of the
highway longer than a reasonable length of time, or
occupy more of the highway than is reasonably
necessary. He should reasonably warn approaching traffic of the obstruction by lights, flares, or
other practical means available under the circumstances.
Appellant complains of the court's instruction
to the jury No. 22 concerning the emergency rule.
Instruction No. 23 given by the court, is a further
instruction on the emergency rule doctrine, and this
is a requested instruction by plaintiff. Plaintiff
cannot request the court to instruct on a theory of
law, and then complain that such theory was presented to the jury. This court has many times held
that a party cannot complain of error, invited by
him. Mann v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 366
P.2d 603; Alvarez v. Paulus, 333 P.2d 633, 8 Utah 2d
283; Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2nd 266, 272 P.2d
185.
In Point III, appellant complains of the number
of instructions given by the court. Of the 46 instructions given, 12 are form instructions concerning the duty of the jury, basic definitions, etc. Elev
en of the instructions are instructions on damages
plaintiff was seeking. Any overweight of number
of instructions was on the side of damage instructions. Instruction were numerous, but rather than
50
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

long complicated instruction, the court gave short,
concise instructions. The fact that the total number
was 47 is no indication of the length of instructions.
Appellant complains of Instruction No. 33. The
theories in that instruction were in part in Instruction No. 26 given by the court, and which was plaintiff's request.
Instruction No. 26, being plaintiff's request, refers to the display of flares, lights, or other practical
means, if a vehicle is not equipped with lights designated by the Utah State Road Commission. The
record fails to reveal any evidence or fact that the
wrecker operated by James Warner Taylor was
equipped, in any manner, by lights designated by the
Utah State Road Commission. There is no evidence
that the Utah State Road Co1nmission designated
any lights for wreckers or any other vehicles. No
evidence being before the court or jury as to what
lights designated by the Utah State Road Commission were required, plaintiff then requested the
court to instruct the jury that Mr. Taylor had the
duty to reasonably warn approaching traffic, etc.,
by displaying lights, flares or other practical means.
Plaintiff cannot now complain that the jury was
instructed as to the duty to put out lights and flares,
etc., when that was the request of plaintiff to
instruct the jury.
51
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in refusing to direct
a verdict for the plaintiff. The court correctly
submitted to the jury the questions of negligence
of plaintiff's decedent and of defendant, and the
court did not commit prejudicial error in the instructions to the jury.

The Judgment on the Verdict should be sustained and plaintiff's appeal denied.
HANSON AND BALDWIN
Ford R. Paulson
Attorneys for Respondent
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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